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ABSTRACT 
This article examines a current circuit split regarding the constitutionality of 
restrictive occupational licensing schemes that exist only for protectionist 
purposes.  The Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles v. Giles and the Tenth Circuit case 
Powers v. Harris, are cases that revolve around similar facts but reach opposite 
outcomes.  The two cases profile state funeral industry licensing restrictions.  In 
both cases, the plaintiffs were penalized for selling caskets without state-issued 
licenses.  
Though licensing restrictions in the funeral industry affect most Americans 
as consumers, the scope of this circuit split reaches into nearly every industry.  
When businesses lobby governments to enact legislation, they establish large, often 
insurmountable barriers to competition. Drawing from scholarly work in this area, 
this article argues that protectionist licensing schemes produce numerous negative 
effects and infringe upon individuals’ right to earn an honest living.  This article 
also looks to a new funeral case that has emerged, which will hopefully have a 
positive impact on the case law surrounding protectionist occupational licensing 
schemes. 
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“[W]hile baseball may be the national pastime of the citizenry, dishing out special 
economic benefits to certain in-state industries remains the favored pastime of state 
and local governments.” –  Tenth Circuit Judge Tacha, Powers v. Harris1 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
How much training would you like someone to have before she sells you 
flowers?  A few years of floral design school?  Perhaps an apprenticeship with a 
master florist?  Should she have passed a state exam on floral design?  Would you 
require a training program by law?  Do lousy bouquets actually create health and 
safety issues?  Though this may seem like a silly question, more and more 
occupations require workers to have a state-granted license in order to perform 
their jobs.  Though “in the 1950s . . . about one in twenty Americans needed the 
government’s blessing to do their job, today that number is more than one in 
three.”2  Though sometimes licenses are created to ensure the health and safety of 
the general public,3often they are only created to protect already established 
businesses from facing new competition.  The requirements one must meet to 
obtain a license come in many forms: specialty degrees, several-year 
apprenticeships, and even approval from one’s competitors in order to enter the 
market.4  Though not always this prevalent in America, these protectionist 
occupational licensing schemes are now seen in many industries.  In fact, these 
laws are so disputed that the debate over their legality has led to a circuit split.   
This comment begins by unveiling a brief history of occupational licensing 
laws in the United States.  It continues in Parts III and IV with an exploration and 
discussion of two factually similar cases from the funeral industry.  These cases 
represent both sides of the circuit split.  Part V analyzes how these cases, and 
others like it, affect economic liberty; more importantly, this comment explains 
                                                          
* Lana Harfoush is a third year student at Pepperdine University School of Law.  She was a Fulbright 
Scholarship recipient and holds her B.A. from the University of Chicago.  She would like to thank her 
parents, Dennis and Cindy Sinnott, Brian Link and the Pacific Legal Foundation. She would also like to 
thank Tim Sandefur and Clint Bolick for their contributions to the field of economic liberty as well as 
personal guidance. 
1 Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004). 
2 Why Can’t Chuck Get His Business Off the Ground, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 02, 2011); see 
also Stephanie Simon, A License to Shampoo: Jobs Needing State Approval Rise, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 
2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703445904576118030935929752. 
html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection.  Simon writes:  
The most recent study, from 2008, found 23% of U.S. workers were required to 
obtain state licenses, up from just 5% in 1950, according to data from [an 
economist]. In the mid-1980s, about 800 professions were licensed in at least one 
state. Today, at least 1,100 are, according to the Council on Licensure, 
Enforcement and Regulation, a trade group for regulatory bodies. Among the 
professions licensed by one or more states: florists, interior designers, private 
detectives, hearing-aid fitters, conveyor-belt operators and retailers of frozen 
desserts. 
Id.  
3 Physicians are a common example of an occupational license created to promote the health and 
safety of the general population.  
4 See infra note 96. 
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why it matters.  Part VI looks at the rational basis test and the problems associated 
with it.  This is the test courts currently use to scrutinize regulations that interfere 
with economic liberties.  Part VII examines an even more recent funeral case now 
set for appellate review, demonstrating the timeliness of this important issue that 
will have a profound impact on the future of occupational licensing schemes 
generally.  Part VII also considers what the role of these laws will be in the years 
to come.  This comment concludes with Part VIII and the hope that an increasing 
number of courts and legislatures will disassemble licensing regulations created for 
protectionist purposes. 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LAWS IN THE US  
Economic liberty is “the right to pursue an honest living in a business or 
profession free from arbitrary government interference.”5  This right has been 
promoted and protected throughout early American history.6  The Founding 
Fathers believed economic liberty was a natural right and that “the individual’s 
right to go into business and keep the fruits of his labor” was “among the most 
important liberties.”7  Influential political economists, such as Adam Smith, argued 
that governments should allow businesses to compete fairly without subsidies and 
special favors because such economic environment was in the consumer’s 
                                                          
5 CLINT BOLICK, DAVID’S HAMMER THE CASE FOR AN ACTIVIST JUDICIARY 98 (Cato Institute 
2007).  Milton Friedman also described an “essential part of economic freedom” as the: 
[F]reedom to use the resources we possess in accordance with our own values—
freedom to enter any occupation, engage in any business enterprise, buy from and 
sell to anyone else, so long as we do so on a strictly voluntary basis and do not 
resort to force in order to coerce others.  Today you are not free to offer your 
services as a lawyer, a physician, a dentist, a plumber, a barber, a mortician, or 
engage in a host of other occupations, without first getting a permit or license 
from a government official. 
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 66 (Harcourt 
1979). 
6 See TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW 23–
25 (Cato Institute 2010).  Regarding occupational licensing schemes in English common law, guilds 
would “use[] their licensing power to create artificial scarcity” in order to protect their jobs and keep 
prices higher than a free market would allow.  Id. at 23.  But often, English courts and prominent 
members of Parliament would speak out in defense of the right to earn a living.  See id. at 18–24.  One 
argument by Lord Coke, claimed that licensing was unnecessary in a marketplace involving many 
occupations where legal redress and damages could be sought for injury.  Id. at 23. Lord Coke further 
explained that the “possibility that a practitioner might do a bad job was not a good excuse for 
restricting economic freedom, raising costs to consumers, and depriving entrepreneurs of economic 
opportunity.”  Id.  English courts believed that the right to earn a living was one of “nationalistic 
concern for increasing the wealth of the realm.”  Id. at 24.  America’s Founders saw it “not as a matter 
of privilege or of public policy[,] but instead as a matter of natural freedom.”  Id.  
7 See id. The Founders’ emphasis on this right is seen in numerous founding documents.  This 
includes the Declaration of Independence’s “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”—which was 
altered from John Locke’s “life, liberty, and estate” and interpreted by many Constitutional scholars as 
referring to the “individual’s right to pursue a trade and thereby improve his position in life.”  Id.  It 
also includes George Mason’s Virginia Declaration of Rights “declaring that ‘all men are by nature 
equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights,’ including ‘the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and 
safety.’”  Id. 
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interest.8  Even charters granted by government authorities did not necessarily 
encompass the right to be free from competition with other businesses.9  At the 
time of the country’s founding, “concern about the evils of state-granted 
monopolies was so prevalent . . . that four states—Massachusetts, North Carolina, 
New Hampshire, and New York— included prohibitions against monopolies in 
their proposed bills of rights when ratifying the Constitution” and “many states 
included such provisions in their own constitutions.”10 
Years later, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities clause 
was created, which “was intended to protect, among other things, the traditional 
right to earn a living free from unreasonable interference.”11  This clause was 
largely in response to the occupational licensing laws enacted after the Civil War 
during Reconstruction; those licensing laws were meant to exclude freed slaves 
from earning a living and owning property.12  The principle author of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities clause, John Bingham, 
explained that the clause was meant to protect in part “the liberty . . . to work in an 
honest calling and contribute by your toil in some sort to the support of yourself, to 
the support of your fellowmen, and to be secure in the enjoyment of the fruits of 
your toil.”13 
This active protection of economic liberties was greatly damaged at the turn 
of the century due to an influx of cheap labor from mass immigration to the United 
States; politicians began to enact legislation that “promote[d] the self-interested 
economic agenda of the politically powerful establishment at the expense of the 
politically disenfranchised, including Irish immigrants, European Jews, Catholics, 
Asians, African-Americans, and as increasing numbers of them began leaving the 
home and entering the workforce, women.”14  Conceptually, the idea is simple: at 
                                                          
8 See id. at 25.  Sandefur emphasizes one of Smith’s most famous quotes on this topic: 
“[c]onsumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to 
be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.”  Id.  In order to 
encourage wealth, governments needed to encourage competition and the quality products that resulted 
from a marketplace untainted by a crony capitalist society.  Id.  
9 See id. at 30 (quoting Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837)).  
10 Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 
898, 901 (2005). 
11 See SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 40. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 41.  Another representative at that time remarked: 
[H]as no every person a right, to carry on his own occupation, to secure the fruits 
of his own industry, and appropriate them as best suits himself, as long as it is a 
legitimate exercise of this right and not vicious in itself, or against public policy, 
or morally wrong, or against the natural rights of others? 
Id.  More modernly, Clint Bolick explained that when it comes to the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Privileges or Immunities clause, “any believer in original intent who devotes even the most cursory 
attention to the legislative history and to the problem Congress sought to correct will conclude that 
Congress unambiguously meant to protect economic liberty against excessive state regulation.”  
BOLICK, supra note 5, at 100. 
14 See Neily, supra note 10, at 901.  Politicians would mask discriminatory legislation under the 
guise of protecting health and safety.  Id. at 901–02.  This was seen everywhere from, New York, where 
it was illegal to roll cigars in tenement houses (where immigrants lived), to many California cities, 
where “forbidding the operation of wooden laundries were supposedly enacted to reduce the risk of 
fire.”  Id. at 902. But actually, the effect “ victimize[d] Chinese immigrants who, as it so happened, 
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that time businesses and workers worried that they would lose an advantage in the 
marketplace when new, cheaper labor arrived.  Though “licensing laws, which 
limit[ed] economic opportunity, were originally allowed insofar as they protected 
the public health and safety,” unfortunately, “as economists predicted, [those laws] 
bec[a]me perverted into a tool for obstructing competition.”15   
Courts at the turn of the century did not strike down every example of 
occupational licensing schemes but instead, “judges struggled mightily to balance 
the legitimate interests of government in serving genuine public purposes with the 
widespread and historically indisputable tendency of politicians to shamelessly sell 
their occupational licensing power to the highest-bidding special interests.”16  But 
amid the balancing tests, the Court never questioned the existence of the right to 
earn a living, and there has “never been any doubt at the Supreme Court about 
whether the Constitution protects the right of citizens to earn a living in the 
occupation of their choice.”17 
Arguably the biggest blow to economic liberty was the Slaughter-House 
Cases,18 in which the Supreme Court’s five to four decision “effectively 
eliminated the [privileges or immunities] clause as a meaningful constitutional 
protection and ensured that, except where other constitutional provisions applied, 
states would have the power to create monopolies and violate the economic 
freedom of entrepreneurs without being limited by federal courts.”19  Many 
                                                          
tended to own wooden laundries while white-owned laundries were generally made of brick or stone.”  
Id. 
15 Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion A Legitimate State Interest? Four Recent Cases Test 
the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023, 1028 (2006). 
16 See Neily, supra note 10, at 902. 
17 Id. at 904. 
18 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).  As Timothy Sandefur describes this case: 
[B]egan in 1869 when the owners of the Crescent City Livestock Landing and 
Slaughtering Company bribed the Louisiana legislature into passing a law that 
required all butchers in the New Orleans area to do their butchering at a single 
slaughterhouse—one owned, of course, by the Crescent City Company.  That 
meant ruin for dozens if not hundreds of small, private butcher shops, which 
would now be required to slaughter their livestock at the Crescent City abattoir.  
Those butchers filed lawsuits, arguing that the new requirement deprived them of 
their common-law right to earn a living—a right that was among the ‘privileges 
or immunities’ of citizenship, which the state could not abridge.  The state argued 
that the law was intended simply to protect the public health and safety, noting 
that many butcher shops were unsanitary affairs.  Requiring that butchering be 
done at a single location would protect the public from the threat of disease.  But 
this theory had one obvious flaw: if the law had been intended as a sanitary 
measure, why had it not regulated the conditions of those butcher shops?  Instead, 
the law merely granted an exclusive economic privilege to a single private 
company.   
SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 41–42. 
19 Id. at 41–43.  This was an abhorrent decision to Justice Stephen J. Field who believed the:  
[A]mendment was intended to incorporate, among other things, the common-law 
right to earn a living – what he called ‘the distinguish privilege of citizens of the 
United States.  To them, everywhere, all pursuits, all professions, all avocations 
are open without other restrictions than such as are imposed equally upon all 
others of the same age, sex, and condition.’ 
Id. at 43. 
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advocates of economic freedom argue that the Court “should have recognized that 
the rights guaranteed by the privileges or immunities clause protect all citizens 
against state governments.”20  At least one scholar has described this case as the 
time when the Court “simply threw in the towel and declared the federal judiciary 
to be out of the business of subjecting economic regulations to any meaningful 
level of scrutiny.”21   
Though the Commerce Clause and the Privileges or Immunities clause were 
meant to “protect citizens against interstate trade barriers,” since Slaughter-House 
the Fourteenth Amendment “is not sufficiently specific to curtail overly 
protectionist trade barriers within a state.”22  Later, Jim Crow era protectionist 
occupational laws were designed to keep African-Americans from earning an 
honest living.  Sadly, those who sought to contest those laws as unconstitutional 
“were deprived by Slaughter-House of their strongest argument, freedom of 
contract.”23  Today, some argue that economic liberty is not a fundamental civil 
right at all, but even the court in Slaughter-House agreed unanimously that it is.24  
There, the Court “did not disagree that [economic liberty] is a fundamental right,” 
but rather whether “that right was protected against abridgement by the states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”25  Though Slaughter-House is infamous for 
damaging the right to earn a living, several other cases since then have been 
notably destructive to economic freedom as well.26  
                                                          
20 See CLINT BOLICK, DEATH GRIP: LOOSENING THE LAW’S STRANGLEHOLD OVER ECONOMIC 
LIBERTY 22 (Hoover Institution Press 2011) [hereinafter DEATH GRIP]. 
21 See Neily, supra note 10, at 903. 
22 See BOLICK, supra note 5, at 109. 
23 Id. at 101.  Instead, the plaintiffs were left to challenge the laws on equal protection grounds.  Id.  
Some of those protectionist laws survive today or until relatively recently.  Id.  One example was the 
story of Ego Brown whose shoeshine business was shutdown in Washington D.C. because of an old law 
that “forbade ‘bootblacks’” from shining shoes on the street.  Id. at 104.  Fortunately, this was struck 
down as a “violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment” and it even failed the rational 
basis test for not being “both conceivable and rational.”  Id. at 105 (quoting Brown v. Barry, 710 F. 
Supp. 352, 355 (D.D.C. 1989)).  Clark Neily points out another example of how restrictive state 
licensing schemes negatively affected blacks in America: 
[S]o-called “emigrant agents,” who traveled around the South encouraging newly 
freed African-Americans to move west to work at understaffed cotton plantations 
in Mississippi and Texas, were subjected to exorbitant “registration fees” and 
occupational taxes--not to thwart the emigration of cheap labor, of course, but 
simply to ensure proper oversight and regulation of their activities.  More blatant 
was the enactment of “Black Codes,” many of which contained ostensibly race-
neutral provisions such as curfew laws that were, in application, clearly designed 
to prevent African-Americans from exercising their hard-won economic liberties. 
Neily, supra note 10, at 902.  See also DEATH GRIP, supra note 20, at 32–33.  
24 Id. at 43. 
25 Id. at 35. 
26 See id. at 9–11. One of these cases includes a 1955 case in which “the court sustained a statute 
prohibiting opticians from duplicating old or broken eyeglass lenses, or form fitting old lenses into new 
frames, without a prescription from a licensed optometrist.”  Id.  Another case that damaged liberty took 
place in 1976, in which the Supreme Court upheld a law that prohibited hot dog pushcarts in New 
Orleans—except for two carts that were “grandfathered” in.  Id.  In a 1993 case, the Supreme Court set 
forth “extreme deference to administrative discretion in a set of rules implementing the rational basis 
standard.”  Id.  This deference became an example of “judicial abdication” where courts would 
“blindingly defer to legislative decision-making.”  Id.  In all three cases, the court deferred to the 
legislature instead of enforcing workers’ economic rights.  Id. 
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Since Slaughter-House, at best, governments have used their power to 
regulate when it was absolutely necessary to protect the health and safety of the 
general welfare; at worst, they have used their power to “insulate one business 
from competition by others.”27  This is an attractive plan for many businesses that 
have a lot to gain from government protection.  Protected companies may “invest a 
great deal of time and money in efforts to influence [government] power in their 
favor” because they profit by keeping other companies out of the marketplace—all 
without the “burden” of competing fairly with better quality or more cost efficient 
products.28  Protected companies can effectively use the government to 
“illegaliz[e] their competition.”29  Sometimes state regulatory boards even enact 
grandfather clauses which “exempt[] existing works from the testing 
requirements.”30  This process hurts new and rising entrepreneurs, who simply 
want to start their businesses without unreasonable interference, and consumers, 
who want to buy quality goods at low prices.   
III.  CRAIGMILES V. GILES: PROTECTIONIST LICENSING REGULATIONS FAIL 
The funeral industry often provides examples of such protected companies.  
In the 2002 Craigmiles v. Giles case, the Sixth Circuit decided the requirement that 
one must be a licensed funeral director simply to sell caskets was “designed only 
for the economic protection of funeral home operators” and “not even rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”31  
In Craigmiles, proprietors of two independent casket stores challenged a 
provision of the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act (FDEA) that 
“forbid[] anyone from selling caskets without being licensed by the state as a 
‘funeral director.’”32  Rev. Nathaniel Craigmiles was one of those proprietors; he 
went into the business because he was “incensed over the exorbitant prices his 
congregants were forced to pay by funeral homes for caskets.”33  The process by 
which those interested in the profession became funeral directors in Tennessee, 
required that they undergo “two years of education and training,” very little of 
which “pertain[ed] to casket design or selection.”34  For this reason, the owners of 
the casket stores argued that the FDEA violated “both the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”35   
The history of the Tennessee FDEA began in 1951 when the funeral 
licensing legislation was originally enacted.36  At that time, the definition of 
“funeral directing” was “limited to the arranging of funeral ceremonies, burial, 
                                                          
27 See SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 141.   
28 Id. 
29 Id.   
30 Simon, supra note 2.  
31 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002). 
32 Id. at 222.  
33 See BOLICK, supra note 5, at 106.  
34 See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222. 
35 Id.   
36 Id. 
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cremation, and embalming” and did not include the sale of caskets.37  This 
changed in 1972 when the definition was expanded by the Tennessee General 
Assembly to include the “making of arrangements to provide for funeral services 
and/or the selling of funeral merchandise, and/or the making of financial 
arrangements for the rendering of the services, and/or the sale of such 
merchandise.”38 
This change forced entrepreneurs, who were exclusively trying to sell 
caskets and funeral merchandise at competitive rates, to undergo rigorous and 
irrelevant training.  The course schedule of the training required that applicants 
“complete[d] either one year of course work at an accredited mortuary school and 
then a one-year apprenticeship with a licensed funeral director or a two-year 
apprenticeship,” followed by taking and passing the state’s Funeral Arts 
Examination.39  At the only school in Tennessee that offered the required 
coursework, Gupton College, students testified that “casket and urn issues 
constituted no more than five percent of the Gupton curriculum.”40  
The plaintiffs in this case operated stores that sold caskets, urns, grave 
markers, monuments, flower holders, and other similar merchandise items.41  
Though the plaintiffs did not engage in “embalming or arranging of funeral 
services, cremations, or burials,” the Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers 
issued a cease and desist order to prevent the plaintiffs from selling funeral 
merchandise including caskets.42  The Board said Craigmiles and the other 
plaintiffs in the case were violating the FDEA for operating without a licensed 
funeral director.43 “Reverend Craigmiles sold the exact same caskets as the funeral 
homes”; the only difference was, he sold them “at a much lower price.”44 
Statutes regulating fundamental rights are subject to a heightened standard of 
review referred to as strict scrutiny, where “the regulation must serve a compelling 
state purpose and be narrowly tailored to achieving that purpose.”45  Other rights 
are subject to rational basis review, where there is a “strong presumption of 
validity,” requiring only that “there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts 
that could provide a rational basis.”46 
The Sixth Circuit noted that “even foolish and misdirected provisions are 
generally valid if subject only to rational basis review.”47  Moreover, those seeking 
                                                          
37 Id. 
38 Id.   “This specific action of requiring licensure . . . appears directed at protecting licensed 
funeral directors from retail price competition.” Id. at 227.  Writing for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Boggs 
noted the obvious protectionist motives of the altered definition: “Tennessee’s justifications for the 
1972 amendment come close to striking us with ‘the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead 
fish.’” Id. at 222.  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-101(a)(3)(A)(ii) (2011).   
39 Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222. 
40 Id.  
41 See id. at 223. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 See BOLICK, supra note 5, at 108. 
45 See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 223. 
46 Id. at 224. 
47 Id. at 223–24. 
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to invalidate a statute using rational basis review are faced with the daunting task 
of “negativ[ing] every conceivable basis that might support it.”48  In spite of the 
very low bar a regulation must pass to be upheld under the rational basis test, the 
court found the licensing requirement was only to protect already operating funeral 
homes from competition, which the Sixth Circuit believed was not a valid state 
interest.  It cited cases proving that courts have “repeatedly recognized that 
protecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate 
governmental purpose.”49  The Sixth Circuit explained that keeping unlicensed 
casket retailers out of the market resulted in higher prices for consumers because 
“funeral home operators sell caskets at prices substantially over total costs” and 
benefit from minimal competition.50   
Though the Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers argued that the 
occupational license requirement was essential to promote health, safety, and 
consumer protection, the Sixth Circuit disagreed.  The Board claimed that the 
license requirement “insure[d] that those who handle[d] dead bodies may dispose 
of them safely and prevent the spread of communicable diseases.”51  However, 
Craigmiles and his fellow plaintiffs neither handled dead bodies nor engaged in the 
embalming process; they were simply trying to earn a living by selling caskets and 
funeral merchandise to eager customers.52  In nearly every case, the plaintiffs 
simply “deliver[ed] the purchased casket to the funeral home.”53  Though a leaking 
casket could pose health and safety risks by contaminating the groundwater with 
bacteria, caskets themselves are not regulated by Tennessee law.54  In fact, 
Tennessee “does not require that any particular type of casket, or any casket at all, 
be used at burial.”55  Caskets sold by licensed funeral directors were in no way 
“systematically more protective than those sold by independent casket retailers”; 
instead, they were simply “systematically more expensive.”56 
The Sixth Circuit explained how the market would lead to safer, better 
quality caskets than the protectionist regulation ever could.  Generally speaking, 
more protective caskets were more expensive, but “nothing prevent[ed] licensed 
funeral directors from selling shoddy caskets at high prices.”57  Increased 
competition would result in more affordable prices, bringing down even the price 
                                                          
48 Id. at 224.  
49 Id.; see City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (“Thus, where simple economic 
protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”).  
50 See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224.  The Sixth Circuit noted that the district court found that 
“funeral home operators generally mark up the price of caskets 250 to 600 percent [sic], whereas casket 
retailers sell caskets at much smaller margins.”  Id. 
51 Id. at 225. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  Judge Boggs notes, “[i]t is perfectly legal in Tennessee for loved-ones to provide a 
homemade casket, for friends to give (but not to sell) a casket for use in burial, or for a body to be 
buried in no container at all. This lack of regulation of body disposal is no different for those who have 
died from contagious diseases.”  Id. 
56 Id. at 225–26. 
57 Id. at 226.  
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of the highest quality caskets, enabling more people to purchase them.58  The court 
found that there was no rational relation between the licensing requirement and 
public safety or consumer protection.59  Many of the misrepresentations and much 
of the fraud that the Board claimed it was trying to prevent via the licensing 
scheme were “generally applicable to retailers already, enforced by civil and 
criminal sanctions.”60  Judge Boggs correctly explained, “the legislature could 
have directly required casket retailers to comply with [particular standards] without 
imposing the licensure requirements.”61   
The Sixth Circuit found the Board’s protectionist licensing regulation 
“illegitimate” and a “significant barrier to competition in the casket market”; 
ultimately the regulation “harm[ed] consumers in their pocketbooks” and did not 
survive even under the overwhelmingly deferential standards of the rational basis 
test.62  Under this analysis, licensing schemes that only provide benefits to already 
existing businesses with political clout (and hurt consumers in the process) are not 
valid regulations.  In essence, these regulations are state sanctioned cartels, which 
impose barriers to entry and keep prices artificially high.  The Sixth Circuit’s 
decision is respectful of both entrepreneurs’ and consumers’ economic liberty.  It 
acknowledges that repercussions for fraud and the promotion of consumer 
protection already exist outside of restrictive licensing schemes.  But, 
unfortunately, this well-reasoned legal analysis has not been adopted nationwide.  
IV.  POWERS V. HARRIS, PROTECTIONIST LICENSING LAWS PREVAIL  
Six days after Craigmiles was decided, an Oklahoma district court, having 
heard a factually similar case, arrived at a vastly different result, only to be 
affirmed by the Tenth Circuit two years later.  That Oklahoma case was Powers v. 
Harris,63 the leading case opposed to the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Craigmiles.  
Thus, a circuit split was created that carries broad and dangerous implications for 
economic liberty. 
Similar to the Craigmiles case, Powers involved a statute that sought to limit 
the sale of funeral-service merchandise,64 including caskets.  Anyone interested in 
                                                          
58 Id.   
59 Id.  Judge Boggs noted that, “[e]ven if casket selection has an effect on public health and safety, 
restricting the retailing of caskets to licensed funeral directors bears no rational relationship to 
managing that effect.”  Id.  The state also argued that during training, licensed funeral directors receive 
psychological training to help them better interact with grieving clientele, to which the court responded: 
“[S]urvivors must deal with a panoply of vendors in order to make funeral arrangements, from churches 
to food vendors for a wake, none of whom is required to have this psychological training. This 
justification is very weak, indeed.”  Id. at 228.  
60 Id. at 226. 
61 Id. at 228. 
62 Id.  Judge Bogg wrote, “we invalidate only the General Assembly’s naked attempt to raise a 
fortress protecting the monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from consumers.  This measure to 
privilege certain businessmen over others at the expense of consumers is not animated by a legitimate 
governmental purpose and cannot survive even rational basis review.”  Id. at 229. 
63 Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004). 
64 In Oklahoma the definition of funeral service merchandise was expanded to “include[e], but not 
[be] limited to, the sale of burial supplies and equipment, but excluding the sale by a cemetery of lands 
or interests therein, services incidental thereto, markers, memorials, monuments, equipment, crypts, 
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selling these products is forced by statute to “be a licensed funeral director 
operating out of a funeral establishment.”65  The Oklahoma statute detailing this 
requirement is called the Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act (FSLA).66  
Curiously, the FSLA does not extend its licensing requirement to retailers who 
“sell other funeral-related merchandise (e.g., urns, grave markers, monuments, 
clothing, and flowers).”67  Another difference between the Oklahoma and 
Tennessee statutes, was that in Oklahoma, the casket-selling regulation 
distinguished time of need sales from pre-paid sales; this permitted salespeople to 
sell caskets “pre-paid without a license so long as that person is acting as an agent 
of a licensed funeral director.”68  The FSLA also only applied intrastate, meaning 
an unlicensed person could sell a casket out of state, but not within the state, if the 
casket was a time of need sale and not paid for in advance.69   
Like the Tennessee regulation, in order to obtain a funeral director’s license 
in Oklahoma, one had to go through rigorous, expensive, and time-consuming 
training.70  Applicants for funeral director’s licenses were required to “complete 
both sixty credit hours of specified undergraduate training and a one-year 
apprenticeship.”71  During the apprenticeship applicants needed to “embalm 
twenty-five bodies.”72  In addition to these requirements, applicants also had to 
“pass both a subject-matter and an Oklahoma law exam.”73  The district court 
noted in this case that “less than five percent of the education and training 
requirements necessary for licensure in Oklahoma pertain[ed] directly to any 
knowledge or skills necessary to sell caskets.”74  Oddly, the Oklahoma State Board 
of Embalmers and Funeral Directors had deemed its excessive training regimen 
and state examination insufficient to sell a casket in-state at the time of someone’s 
death.  Thus, the Oklahoma State Board required sellers of funeral merchandise to 
operate out of a funeral establishment.  This means anyone hoping to sell caskets at 
the time of need must “have [had] a fixed physical location, a preparation room 
that meets the requirements for embalming bodies, a funeral-service merchandise-
selection room with an inventory of not less than five caskets, and adequate areas 
for public viewing of human remains.”75 
Kim Powers and Dennis Bridges owned an online store called Memorial 
Concepts Online, Inc., through which they sold funeral merchandise.  Their 
business “offered no other death- or funeral-related services, plays no role in the 
                                                          
niches or outer enclosures.”  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 396.2 (West 2010). 
65 Powers, 379 F.3d at 1211. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1212.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 1213–14.  The district court commented on the inefficiency and absurd demand where 
funeral merchandise retailers were “required to spend years of their lives equipping themselves with 
knowledge and training which is not directly relevant to selling caskets.” Id. at 1214.  
75 Id. at 1212–13. 
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disposition of human remains, and is not licensed in Oklahoma as a funeral 
establishment.”76  Neither Powers nor Bridges had the requisite license to sell 
caskets; plus, because they sold their merchandise online, the business lacked the 
“fixed physical location” mentioned above.  But those two were not strangers to 
the funeral business.  Powers actually had “many years of experience selling 
caskets on a pre-need basis as the agent of a licensed Oklahoma funeral director,” 
and Bridges was licensed in Tennessee for over twenty years; objectively, the two 
plaintiffs were overqualified to sell caskets, which at their basic level, are simply 
boxes.77  
The district court opined in its decision that this licensing scheme showed 
“intent to forego laissez faire treatment of those sales and services when provided 
in [Oklahoma].”78  The plaintiffs in this case wanted to sell caskets in-state to 
consumers at the time of their loved ones’ deaths, but feared legal action if they 
were to provide that service.  The plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action, 
asserting that the FSLA violated the Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and 
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.79   
The Board argued that the licensing regulation was necessary to protect 
casket purchasers because of the great potential for emotional and psychological 
pain, making them “a particularly vulnerable group.”80  Like the Craigmiles case, 
the level of scrutiny for this licensing regulation was the rational basis test.  Even 
though the Board admitted that its licensing scheme did “not perfectly match its 
asserted consumer-protection goal,” the Board also argued that it was close enough 
to be upheld; unfortunately the Tenth Circuit agreed.81  The circuit court explained 
that it must “consider every plausible legitimate state interest that might support 
the FSLA”—even at the expense of the right to earn a living and economic 
freedom.82  
As in Craigmiles, the court spoke of the deferential nature of the rational 
basis test.  Citing a 1938 Supreme Court case,83 it argued that when legislative 
judgment is challenged on the basis of equal protection and the “issue is debatable, 
the decision of the legislature must be upheld if ‘any state of facts either known or 
which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it.’”84  The Tenth Circuit 
opined that questioning the legislature’s regulations or suggesting alternative 
                                                          
76 Id. at 1213.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. The district court also noted, “very little specialized knowledge is required to sell caskets. 
Most consumers select caskets based on price and style. Any information a generally educated person 
needs to know about caskets in order to sell them can be acquired on the job.” Id. 
79 Id. at 1214. 
80 Id. at 1215.  
81 Id. at 1216. The Board claimed its regulation was “not ‘wholly irrelevant’ because ‘[e]very 
witness who testified on the subject agreed that consumers purchasing time-of-need caskets may be 
especially vulnerable to overreaching sales tactics because of grief and other emotions which arise as 
the result of the death of the person for whom the consumer is purchasing a casket.’”  Id. 
82 Id. at 1218. 
83 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938). 
84 Powers, 379 F.3d at 1216–17.  
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solutions were not permitted under a rational basis test analysis.85  It looked to 
cases explaining that rational basis review upholds laws even though they “may 
not succeed in bringing about the result it seeks to accomplish” or because “no 
empirical evidence supports the assumptions underlying the legislative choice.”86  
The bar for upholding laws under this test was and still is incredibly low; in many 
circumstances the rational basis test requires that the party unlucky enough to 
challenge the regulation must “negative every conceivable basis which might 
support it.”87   
The Tenth Circuit explained that when scrutinizing regulations there is a 
strong presumption of validity.  This presumption is so strong that it kills virtually 
all arguments of even illegitimate intended purposes, such as protectionism.  This 
reasoning begs the question: why then, do courts not automatically dismiss every 
challenge to a regulatory scheme?  The Tenth Circuit defended its decision by 
listing a parade of horribles that might occur if courts decided to intervene when 
legislatures behaved badly.  It wanted to avoid “paralyz[ing] state governments . . . 
constantly asking them to ‘try again’” or “substituting [its] view of the public good 
or the general welfare for that chosen by the states” when the “definition of public 
good changes with the political winds.”88  But the Tenth Circuit ignored the fact 
that established businesses lobby politicians to shut competition out; those fickle 
political winds the court alluded to will leave honest businesspeople— people 
trying to fairly provide goods and services to the public —out of luck. The right to 
earn a living is just that: a right.  Like other rights, courts must protect it.89   
In spite of the Tenth Circuit’s reluctance to interfere with legislative intent, 
its opinion seemed focused on the “wide-ranging” externalities that its decision 
would have on policy: the circuit court worried that if they had overturned the 
statute, “every piece of legislation in six states aiming to protect or favor one 
industry or business over another in the hopes of luring jobs to that state would be 
in danger.”90  In other words, the circuit court would be responsible for protecting 
the entrepreneur’s right to earn a living and harming blatant occupational 
protectionism not just in the case at hand, but in the several states that constitute 
the Tenth Circuit.  The Tenth Circuit also opined that the plaintiffs “must turn to 
the Oklahoma electorate” to abolish such regulations; but when pre-existing 
businesses support politicians in order to construct large barriers to entry in their 
occupations, it is for the courts, not the electorate, to protect minority rights.91   
                                                          
85 Id. at 1217. 
86 Id.  See Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 50 (1966); see also Vance v. Bradley, 
440 U.S. 93, 110–11 (1979).  
87 Powers, 379 F.3d at 1217 (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)). 
88 Id. at 1218. 
89 Amici in this case advocated for the plaintiffs and others like them, urging the Tenth Circuit to 
see that economic protectionism was not a legitimate state interest to be supported by licensing schemes 
or otherwise. Amicus curiae briefs were filed by: John Eastman, The Claremont Institute Center for 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, Orange, CA; Deborah J. La Fetra and Timothy Sandefur, Pacific Legal 
Foundation, Sacramento, CA in conjunction with Mark K. Moller, Cato Institute, Washington D.C.  Id. 
at 1211.     
90 Id. at 1222.   
91 Id.; see generally BOLICK, supra note 5.   
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V.  HOW THESE CASES AFFECT ECONOMIC LIBERTY AND WHY IT MATTERS 
The funeral industry affects all of us at some point or another.  Funerals are 
commonly the third highest cost a family ever accrues—usually behind a family’s 
home and car.92  Nationally, between 22,000 and 23,000 funeral establishments 
make arrangements for “approximately two million people each year.”93  In 2007, 
the average cost of a funeral was $7,323; caskets often account for one-third to 
one-half of that cost.94   
Although licensing restrictions in the funeral industry affect most Americans 
as consumers, the scope of this circuit split reaches far beyond that, into nearly 
every existing industry.  When businesses lobby governments to enact legislation, 
they establish large, often insurmountable barriers to competition.  Unsurprisingly, 
many different kinds of businesses want to benefit from government favors—and 
legislatures are often happy to oblige.  The benefits of licensing are “heavily 
concentrated in current practitioners and the liabilities are dispersed among 
potential new practitioners and consumers,” and those “currently licensed have a 
much stronger incentive to lobby for licensing restrictions than potential 
practitioners and consumers have to lobby against them.”95   
Several non-profit, public interest law firms and think tanks specialize in 
cases where the right to earn a living is threatened and advocate for entrepreneurs.  
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) and the Institute for Justice (IJ) are two of 
those public interest law firms.  Both firms have unearthed many industries where 
protectionist occupational licensing requirements are the norm.  
For example, Missouri is one of many states that has enacted restrictions for 
people in the moving industry.96  In one of PLF’s current cases, a man who has 
been operating his moving company in St. Louis, Missouri for over twenty years 
was notified that he needed a special license called a certificate of necessity to stay 
in business.97  The statute at issue in that case states: “the Department of 
Transportation shall notify existing moving companies, and permit them to 
intervene in the application process and object to a new application on the basis 
that a new company is ‘inconsistent with the public convenience and necessity.’”98  
In other words, this man who has been in business for two decades, with an 
Angie’s List quality rating,99 is forced by law to ask his competitors whether or not 
he is allowed to operate.100  Naturally, several existing companies objected to his 
                                                          
92 Complaint at 4, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 2717 (E.D. La. Aug. 
12, 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-02717).  
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Anthony B. Sanders, Exhumation Through Burial: How Challenging Casket Regulations Helped 
Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L. REV. 668, 694 (2004). 
96 Anticompetition laws collide with the Constitution: Munie v. Skouby, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. 
http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=1224 (last visited Nov. 21, 2011). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 ABC QUALITY MOVERS, http://www.abcqualitymovers.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
100 Anticompetition, supra note 96. 
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application.101  These certificate of necessity laws are arguably worse than the 
occupational licensing restrictions at issue in the funeral cases, because “they exist 
for the explicit purpose of stifling competition and protecting established 
businesses against newcomers,” and do not even pretend to appeal to arguments of 
health and safety.102  PLF argues that the Missouri scheme was created “not to 
protect public health and safety but to protect established businesses against 
competition by [new] entrepreneurs” and, therefore, the statute “violates the Due 
Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”103   
To put it another way, just imagine what would happen if a new fast food 
chain had to prove to McDonald’s and Burger King that another hamburger joint 
was necessary in a particular community; or if a new purse manufacturer had to 
ask Coach and Kate Spade for permission to make handbags.  These businesses 
have an interest in making a profit and keeping their market shares if at all 
possible.  If these schemes are constructed in a way that gives competitors the last 
word on newcomers entering a market, then those new businesses will rarely, if 
ever, be allowed to operate.  It is just as easy as saying: no, new entrepreneur, your 
business isn’t necessary because we’re already here.   
It is consumers who should decide what is necessary in the marketplace, not 
by lobbying the government for special favors, but instead by making choices with 
their individual purchasing power.  Consumers are best situated to decide what 
products and services best suit them as individuals.  Charles Wheelan, a lecturer of 
public policy and University of Chicago professor, sums it up well: “It’s fairly easy 
for you to tell whether you’ve gotten a bad haircut or not, and if quality turns out to 
be bad, it’s not a big social problem.”104  The lasting impact of “bad” products is 
often miniscule, if present at all—it’s not something the legislature needs to 
control.  Businesses and entrepreneurs are forced to take responsibility for bad 
products because inferior quality loses customers.   
There is little evidence to support the assertion that licensing requirements 
ensure quality goods and services.  In Alabama, which has the “strictest licensing 
requirements” for manicurists, it is mandatory that would-be manicurists complete 
“750 hours of schooling and a written and practical exam.”105  According to the 
Alabama Board of Cosmetology, there is an average of “four public complaints a 
year” regarding Alabaman manicurists’ poor service.106  Connecticut, on the other 
hand, takes a different approach and doesn’t require manicurists to have a license 
                                                          
101 Id. 
102 Timothy Sandefur, Government’s CON job, PLF LIBERTY BLOG (June 27, 2011), 
http://plf.typepad.com/plf/2011/06/governments-con-job.html; see also Tim Sandefur, CON Job: State 
“certificate of necessity” laws protect firms, not consumers, REGULATION MAGAZINE, 42 (Summer 
2011), http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv34n2/regv34n2-1.pdf.  
103 Anticompetition, supra note 96; see Timothy Sandefur, Federal Court allows PLF’s lawsuit 
against Missouri mover cartel to proceed, PLF LIBERTY BLOG (Mar. 8, 2011), http://plf.typepad.com/ 
plf/2011/03/federal-court-allows-plfs-lawsuit-against-missouri-mover-cartel-to-proceed.html.  
104 Simon, supra note 2. 
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at all.107  Does this make a difference in number of annual complaints?  Surely 
they must surge!  To the chagrin of licensing boards, that is not the case.  There is 
an average of only “six complaints a year to the state [of Connecticut] over the past 
five years” regarding manicurists there; of those six, four are usually about gift 
certificates that are not honored.108  It is doubtful that Alabama includes a special 
“gift certificate course” in its mandatory curriculum.   
Not moving or getting a manicure anytime soon?  Imagine instead, that you 
want someone to fix a broken computer.  In the state of Texas, computer repairmen 
must be licensed.  This means they are “required to have a degree in criminal 
justice or perform a three-year apprenticeship under a licensed private 
investigator” simply to fix computers.109  That is devastating news for computer 
savvy college students trying to earn a little cash.  It is also frustrating news for 
consumers who want to hire technicians.  This law increases costs to enter the 
profession, which increases costs for services and limits the number of technicians.  
How many people with the knowledge and skills to fix computers are going to 
spend three years learning how to become private investigators or earn degrees that 
have nothing to do with instructional computer repair?  IJ has brought this case and 
it has yet to be decided.   
Returning to this Comment’s opening question, how much training would 
you require someone to have in order to sell you flowers?  Let’s say you were 
interested in buying flowers in Louisiana a couple of years ago.  Only last year in 
2010 was the Louisiana florists licensing scheme lifted by the legislature—thanks 
to negative press and the pressure of an upcoming IJ lawsuit.110  Before it was 
lifted, a test was administered that applicants needed to pass in order to sell floral 
arrangements.  Each year the state would “arbitrarily fail[] numerous test takers” 
in order to control the number of florists within Louisiana—though the regulation 
was enacted under the guise of health and safety.111  Today, there is still a required 
test but it is much more simple and would not lead to the arbitrary exclusion of 
florists trying to enter the market.   
The lead attorney in the florist case, Tim Keller, remarked, “I can’t conceive 
of an occupation less in need of government regulation than floral arranging.”112  
IJ’s argument was similar to other legal arguments made against protectionist 
occupational licensing laws.  Keller explained, “there is no reason to license 
florists because there is no risk to anyone from buying flower arrangements from 
unlicensed florists.”113  As in the Louisiana florist case, sometimes legislatures are 
persuaded to lift their protectionist bans because of public outcry.114   
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109 New Texas Law Limits Computer Repair To Licensed Private Investigators Rife v. Tex. Private 
Sec. Bd., INST.FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/economicliberty/2188 (last visited Nov. 21, 2011). 
110 Shira Rawlinson & Tim Keller, Institute for Justice Files New Legal Challenge Against 
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114 See also Oregon Unfairly, and Unconstitutionally, Bars Entry to the Moving Business: Sweet v. 
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As discussed throughout this comment, occupational licensing laws are often 
abused by legislatures in conjunction with pre-existing businesses to protect the 
market shares they already possess.  When businesses can control who enters the 
market, they can reward themselves by keeping prices higher than the market 
would allow if others were allowed to compete.  Morris Kleiner, a labor professor 
at the University of Minnesota, “looked at census data covering several 
occupations that are regulated in some states but not others, including librarians, 
nutritionists and respiratory therapists.”115  Kleiner found that “employment 
growth in those professions was about 20% greater, on average, in the unregulated 
states between 1990 and 2000.”116  He found in another study, that “licensed 
workers earn, on average, 15% more than their unlicensed counterparts in other 
states—a premium that may be reflected in their prices.”117  He also estimated that 
licensing laws added “at least $116 billion a year to the cost of services” in the 
United States—which is “about 1% of total consumer spending.”118   
In a February 2011 Wall Street Journal article, a short list was compiled of 
jobs that are subject to occupational licensing regulations in at least one or more 
states.119  The list was comprised of four major categories: Personal Care, Flora 
and Fauna, Product and Home Care, and Other.120  Jobs listed included: wig 
specialists, shampoo specialists, naturopathic doctors, hearing aid dispensers, 
athletic trainers, nuisance control specialists, wildlife rehabilitators, dog handlers, 
land surveyors, appliance repair technicians, windshield installers, bedding supply 
dealers, computer repair technicians, handymen, locksmiths, automotive parts 
recyclers, private detectives, shorthand reporters, vending machine operators, 
student athlete agents, professional wrestlers, and tour guides.121  The Wall Street 
Journal’s list is far from exhaustive.  In the business climate of today, all industries 
are fair game to the legislatures and regulatory boards eager to impose licensing 
restrictions upon them.  
VI.  MORE ON THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY 
As for the rational basis test, and as the opinions in Powers and Craigmiles 
make clear, there are many grounds for criticism with this notoriously low standard 
of review.  Often, courts are reluctant to overstep their bounds and interfere with 
legislative intent; this was the primary reason that the Tenth Circuit in Powers 
upheld the protectionist licensing scheme before it.122  In these cases, courts often 
suggest that individuals who believe their economic rights are being violated by 
state occupational licensing schemes, should use the political process for 
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protection of their rights instead of the judicial system.123  These courts fail to 
acknowledge in their opinions that “economic regulations are generally not enacted 
by legislatures at all but by administrative agencies not answerable to voters.”124  
If a given state regulatory board is trying to push budding start-up businesses out 
of the marketplace, and is also untouchable by both the judiciary and political 
process, that leaves very little in the way of redress for thousands of budding 
entrepreneurs throughout the country.   
Some advocates of economic liberty and the right to earn an honest living do 
not inherently reject the rational basis test; rather, they call for an application 
where the state “articulates[s] a legitimate police-power justification, such as 
health or safety, and demonstrate[s] that the law actually is related in a rational 
way to that objective.”125  If a law survived this application, it would be upheld.  
Thus, the right to earn a living would be slightly more secure because purely 
protectionist occupational licensing schemes would not be upheld.   
Other advocates are less accepting of the test.  One IJ lawyer described the 
test as a “sham” that is “shamelessly pro-Government” which he believes “perverts 
our system of justice” in application.126  Clark Neily explained that when the Court 
established the test over 100 years ago, the Court created a “fictive standard of 
review that enables judges to speak as if the right of occupational freedom still 
exists, without actually having to act as though it does.”127  Because the legislature 
never really has to provide the rationale for its proposed regulation, “facts tend to 
be relevant only insofar as they help support the challenged regulation” or 
government lawyers “simply make them up” to support the presumption of having 
a rational basis for the regulation.128  Neily worries that this encourages witnesses 
to lie on the stand about the extensiveness of training required to perform a given 
occupation.129  For example, in the Powers case, a government witness defending 
the casket regulation claimed under oath that sellers of caskets should know “how 
atomic particles interact with each other” and “how a virus reproduces itself.”130  
Additionally, the rational basis test requires judges to “assist the government in 
defending challenged regulations by dreaming up possible justifications of their 
own”—something that does not exist in American law outside of the rational basis 
                                                          
123 See supra Parts III, IV. 
124 See SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 140. 
125 See BOLICK, supra note 5. 
126 See Neily, supra note 10, at 898–900.  Neily explains that: 
Because the rational basis test is so shamelessly pro-government, to have even 
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130 See id. (quoting Deposition of Kenneth Curl, Ph.D., Powers v. Harris, No. CIV-01-445 (W.D. 
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standard.131  
Opponents of the rational basis standard note that judges’ presumptive 
deference to enacted regulations, combined with their great contributions to the 
government’s side of the argument, produce a variety of negative, unintended 
consequences.  Some argue that judges witness real fraud and corruption within the 
political process and, because of the rational basis test, are expected to look the 
other way.132  This puts plaintiffs in very tough situations.  Worse, when citizens 
want to assert their basic right to earn a living, under the rational basis test they are 
charged with the discouraging and virtually impossible task of “‘negativing’ every 
conceivable justification that might be advanced in support of a law.”133  So not 
only are aggrieved plaintiffs worried about being unable to support their families 
by doing honest work, but they must also worry about tackling every rationale for 
a regulation; this is not just what is stated in the regulation, or what is stated in the 
legislative records, but also whatever the judge may think of while on the bench.  
This is an overwhelming, discouraging, and impossible task.   
When it comes to combating the rational basis test, there is also the option of 
elevating the right to earn a living to its rightful status of other “fundamental” 
rights.  This would subject regulations, which restrict the right to earn a living, to a 
higher level of scrutiny.  If the right to earn a living is afforded review under 
intermediate or strict scrutiny, this would be unquestionably more protective of 
economic liberty (though admittedly that is a tall order for the time being).  Unless 
something changes, there is no question that the “rational basis test problem” is a 
massive hurdle that must be overcome when dealing with cases involving 
protectionist occupational licensing regulations and economic liberty.  
VII.  A NEW FUNERAL CASE EMERGES AND WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS 
It is difficult to predict what the next stop on the road of protectionist 
licensing schemes will be.  Some economic liberty advocates note with frustration 
that when “government destroys a person’s livelihood or business, even for the 
most nefarious of purposes, courts typically will stand idly by.”134  But the court in 
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Craigmiles and others like it,135 put forward opinions that seem promising for the 
future of economic liberty in the face of purely protectionist licensing laws.  
Though “[t]he Supreme Court has not struck down a law on economic substantive 
due process grounds since 1936,”  the lower federal courts and state courts are 
increasingly “overturn[ing] decisions made by state and local governments on the 
grounds that they violate economic substantive due process.”136   
Recently, a new case has emerged and is receiving a lot of attention for 
addressing these questions (and once again in the funeral industry).  The case was 
filed in 2010 by the IJ, on behalf of its client Saint Joseph Abbey of St. Benedict, 
Louisiana; a group of monks.137  Those Benedictine monks have lived and worked 
in their Abbey for over one hundred years.138  Originally, the monks had “farmed 
and harvested timber on their land,” but in the 1990s their advisors told them to 
find another way to support their Order.139  The monks made caskets for decades 
for their small abbey community and eventually began using the caskets to provide 
income for their monastery as requests for their finely crafted products 
increased.140  In 2007, the abbey “invested roughly $100,000 in a woodshop to sell 
the simple caskets it had always made for its own monks.”141  Monks in other 
states such as Indiana, Iowa, Illinois, and Minnesota have similar workshops in 
which they make caskets to pay their respective monasteries’ bills.142  
Unfortunately for the Louisianan monks, when a local Catholic newspaper 
publicized their casket-making business, the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers 
and Funeral Directors “slapped the abbey with a cease-and-desist order.”143  
Generally, the facts are reminiscent of Craigmiles and Powers, where a 
group of individuals are under attack for selling “funeral merchandise” without the 
appropriate state issued license.  The Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and 
Funeral Directors, which is “dominated by industry members,” is enforcing a 
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regulation that could jail the monks for up to 180 days.144  According to the initial 
subpoena that the monks received, “a party can be subject to fines between $500 
and $2,500 for each casket illegally sold.”145  What real harm do the monks’ 
handcrafted caskets cause?  One funeral home director down the road from the 
abbey complained that the monks were, “cutting into [his] profit.”146  This is a 
curious complaint considering that they only sold sixty caskets since 2007, in a 
state that has around 40,000 deaths annually.147  However, this perceived 
economic harm seems to be enough for the State Board of Embalmers and Funeral 
Directors to try and stop the monks from providing their high-quality goods to 
consumers.  
It is not uncommon for state regulatory boards to wedge themselves between 
aggrieved parties and the legislature that grants businesses special favors.  The 
monks sought help from their local state legislature “who agreed in May 2008 to 
introduce a bill amending the law to permit casket sales by non-licensed funeral 
directors.”148  The bill went to the House Commerce Committee and thereafter 
“funeral-industry lobbyist opposed the bill” and “several funeral directors showed 
up at the hearing to register their disapproval.”149  In 2010, the state senate also 
failed to pass legislation exempting the monks from the law due to pressure from 
the funeral industry.150 
Because handcrafted caskets are covered by the state’s definition of funeral 
merchandise, this order of monks would have to “abandon their calling for one full 
year to apprentice at a licensed funeral home” and take an examination.151  The 
regulations require the “funeral-director exam to cover topics such as sociology, 
psychology, funeral directing, funeral-service law, Louisiana laws and regulations, 
and anything else the State Board deems relevant.”152  Unfortunately, what the 
State Board deems relevant is far from what common sense deems relevant.  If one 
wants to handcraft and sell caskets, one’s knowledge of the great majority of the 
required curriculum is irrelevant.  The regulation will also subject the monks to 
“substantial ongoing continuing education requirements” with which state-licensed 
funeral directors must comply.153   
Additionally, the monks would be forced to “convert their monastery into a 
‘funeral establishment’ by, among other things, installing equipment for 
embalming human remains.”154  Not only is the conversion of the workshop into a 
funeral establishment an expensive and time-consuming feat, it is also entirely 
useless because the monks never handle or embalm human remains.  The monks 
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simply attempt to pay their bills and support their abbey by building and selling 
wooden caskets to people who want to buy them.  There is no coercion of any kind 
involved, just a product from which the monks derive income to support 
themselves—a product that some people choose to buy.   
The regulation cannot be valid under the guise of health and safety, because 
caskets are not regulated in Louisiana—there is no law stating that dead bodies 
must be buried in caskets.155  IJ’s complaint goes further by noting that a casket is 
not necessary just in Louisiana, but is “not required for burial in any state in the 
country.”156  In fact, a person could simply be buried in the ground covered by a 
blanket or nothing at all.157  Some environmental groups even encourage using 
cardboard or no caskets.158  This occupational licensing law appears to be nothing 
more than a protectionist scheme so that already licensed funeral directors can 
keep “the lucrative funeral market to [themselves].”159   
Another interesting aspect of this case and others, is that Louisiana “does not 
require most sellers of other nonperishable goods to obtain specialized licenses,” 
such as for “clothing, computers, furniture, nonprescription medical supplies, or 
kitchen supplies.”160  The state also does not require “other retailers to obtain 
licenses that are only tangentially related to the goods being sold, as it does for 
caskets.”161  To illustrate that point, IJ’s initial complaint on behalf of the monks, 
noted that Louisiana “does not require shoe salesmen to obtain podiatry licenses, 
or mattress salesmen to obtain chiropractic licenses.”162   
When Louisiana does require retail occupations to have a specialized state 
license, there must be a “direct relationship between the good being sold and both 
the training required for the license and concerns about public health and safety 
with the underlying product.”163  IJ’s complaint references the fact that “retail 
pharmacies must have a licensed pharmacist to sell prescription medication.”164  
This is a clear and direct relationship between the service/product and the license 
required to provide that service, as well as a clear link to public health and safety.  
When it comes to the monks’ casket case and other protectionist occupational 
licensure cases (ie. cases that are just created to help businesses that already exist 
keep their market shares intact), most of those regulations lack a direct link to 
health, safety, and the industry that the regulation intends to influence.165   
But as IJ’s website warns, if businesses with government assistance are 
“willing to go after monks, then no one in America is safe from organized special 
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interests and their allies in state legislatures.”166  IJ and the monks have already 
publicized this case in attempts to inform the public about the licensing law and 
educate them about the basic right to earn a living.167  Public opinion has played an 
important role for these pubic interest law firms in the past.  As explained above, 
often these law firms can use public opinion to pressure legislatures to repeal anti-
competitive legislation: it may help in this case.  Some media sources have brought 
similar purely protectionist licensing restrictions to light. 
On July 21, 2011 the Eastern District Court of Louisiana struck the 
Louisiana licensing scheme down for violating the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the Constitution.168  The court stated clearly that there was 
“no rational basis for the State of Louisiana to require persons who seek to enter 
into the retailing of caskets to undergo the training and expense necessary to 
comply with [the licensing scheme’s] rules.”169  The court also noted that “there is 
nothing in the licensing procedures that bestow[] any benefit to the public in the 
context of retail caskets,” and that “the sole reason for these laws is the economic 
protection of the funeral industry which reason the Court has previously found not 
to be a valid government interest standing alone to provide a constitutionally valid 
reason for these provisions.”170  The court followed the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning 
in Craigmiles, finding for the plaintiff monks, asserting that the defendants’ 
arguments were “hollow.”171  The court’s analysis explained that the licensing 
scheme promoted neither consumer protection nor public health and safety.172  The 
opinion noted that “the provisions simply protect a well-organized industry that 
seeks to maintain a strict hold on [that] business.”173  This district court decision 
was great news for the monks and their business.  However, their victory may be 
short-lived.  The State of Louisiana Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors 
(not interested in losing their protectionist advantages so quickly) have already 
filed an appeal.174  This appeal will send the case to the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which will hopefully affirm the district court’s decision.   
A 2011 Wall Street Journal article noted that poor economic conditions have 
moved some legislators to think twice before passing some new licensing 
regulations; it stated that “the licensing push is meeting pockets of resistance, 
including a move by some legislators to require a more rigorous cost-benefit 
analysis before any new licensing laws are approved.”175  The article also noted 
that some people were considering a variety of negative consequences of large 
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regulatory regimes that “spawn[] huge bureaucracies including rosters of 
inspectors,” and because of many requirements’ “pricey educations,” they 
“prohibit low-income workers from breaking in to entry-level trades.”176  Some 
note that the high rate of occupational regulation in the service industry is 
particularly troubling because the service industry makes up “three-quarters of 
gross domestic product and most job growth in the U.S.,” and the potential number 
of jobs in that sector are being capped by occupational licensing laws aimed at 
helping pre-established businesses.177 
Beyond public opinion, and its effect on legislative bodies, is the judiciary.  
The more that circuit courts come down affirmatively on one side or the other, the 
more likely the Supreme Court will take notice of the growing nationwide split, 
hear a similar case, and set a national standard, which will explicitly prohibit 
protectionist occupational licensing schemes nationwide.  Ideally, the Fifth Circuit 
will affirm the district court’s decision and, like the Ninth Circuit,178 set another 
circuit court precedent supporting the Sixth Circuit’s Craigmiles decision.  
Not everyone is so optimistic.  Some argue that the Court is torn between the 
“Court’s rhetoric, which still refers—accurately—to occupational freedom as a 
constitutional right” and its holdings, “which no longer provide any meaningful 
protection for that right and instead permit legislators to trample and abuse the 
right with near total impunity.”179  Others believe the victory for economic liberty 
in the Craigmiles case did not go far enough: though the opinion talked about 
protectionism as an illegitimate government interest, the opinion missed the 
opportunity to comment on the “irrationality of requiring occupational training that 
has nothing to do with one’s occupation.”180  Critics of occupational licensing laws 
have not forgotten the ugly, discriminatory history that many of those laws share; 
some note that even today, the groups hit hardest by these laws are minority 
entrepreneurs and those who come from low a socio-economic status.181   
One important fact worth conveying is that many prominent advocates of the 
right to earn a living do not expect or wish to abolish occupational licenses 
completely—for example, few people support less training and requirements for 
heart or brain surgeons.182  However, these specialized surgeons are generally 
clear-cut examples of regulation in the interest of health and safety.  Unfortunately, 
many protectionist regulations are not clear-cut in this manner.  An interior 
                                                          
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 See Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2008).  
179 Neily, supra note 10, at 905. 
180 See Sanders, supra note 95, at 685–86. 
181 Id. at 695. 
182 Though some do argue that medical licensing “fails to protect consumers from incompetent 
physicians” and “by raising barriers to entry, makes health care more expensive and less accessible.”  
See Shirley Svorny, Medical Licensing: An Obstacle to Affordable, Quality Care, CATO INST. (Sept. 17, 
2008)  http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9640.  Additionally, “institutional oversight and a 
sophisticated network of private accrediting and certification organizations, all motivated by the need to 
protect reputations and avoid legal liability, offer whatever consumer protections exist today.” Id.  
Though even this study acknowledges the many political difficulties in doing away with medical 
licensing.  Id. 
2011 GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR ECONOMIC LIBERTY 159 
 
decorator is not a heart surgeon; a hair braider, not a brain surgeon.  Many of these 
occupations that are less intuitively linked with health and safety are the targets of 
regulations that stretch the law as far as possible to benefit the interests of only a 
few.  Those occupational licensing laws are based upon a meritless “because I said 
so” justification.  This helps a select few, but leaves many hardworking, honest 
entrepreneurs, who labor in harmless occupations, out in the cold.  The circuit split 
that exists today provides some hope that purely protectionist occupational licenses 
will not stand.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Not even the savviest political theorist or legal historian can exactly define 
what will happen to protectionist licensing schemes on a national level.  The future 
of anti-competitive licensing laws is yet to be determined.  One thing is for certain: 
the multi-circuit split surrounding protectionist occupational licensing schemes in 
the funeral industry has grave consequences for entrepreneurs all across the 
country in a vast range of occupations.  When already-established businesses join 
forces to keep new competitors out, they create excessive barriers to entry that 
destroy countless potential jobs.  To name a few, these barriers to entry come in 
the form of expensive degrees, superfluous training, exorbitant fees, mandatory 
full-time apprenticeships, and even “convincing” one’s competitors that new 
business is necessary in their fields.   
One of the greatest ironies is that many protectionist occupational licensing 
regulations are enacted for the “consumer’s interest and protection.”  In reality, the 
effect of these licensing schemes is only to protect businesses that already exist.  
These laws keep prices artificially high and allow businesses to reduce product 
quality without suffering market consequences.  Entrepreneurs and consumers 
alike can remain hopeful that the ultimate and eventual resolution of the funeral 
circuit split will overcome the problematic rational basis test and come down 
against protectionism—in favor of economic liberty.  
